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and only be liable for the amount of the premium paid.'1 The Parker
decision is in accord with these holdings.
MISCELLANEOUS
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1976 (the Act),
49 U.S.C. section 303 (1990), prohibits the Secretary of Transportation (the
Secretary) from approving a highway project that requires the use of a
public park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or land of
national, state, or local historical significance unless the Secretary makes
several findings. First, the Secretary must find that no prudent and feasible
alternatives to the proposed use of the protected land exist. If no prudent
and feasible alternatives exist, the Secretary must find that the project
includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation area,
refuge, or historic site.
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of review of the Secretary's
action under section 4(f) of the Act in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe.I 8s The Court held that the reviewing court should consider three
factors in reviewing the Secretary's action. First, the court must determine
whether the Secretary acted within the scope of the secretary's authority,
which includes a determination of whether the Secretary could reasonably
have believed that no feasible and prudent alternatives existed.'16 Second,
the court must determine whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In making this determination, the
reviewing court must consider whether the Secretary's decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors or whether the decision involved
a clear error of judgment. 8 7 Finally, the reviewing court must consider
whether the Secretary followed all procedural requirements.' In applying
these three factors to reach its decision in Overton Park, the Supreme Court
indicated that a proposed highway route that would require the use of
protected land could not be used unless the alternatives to the proposed
184. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 923 F.2d 279, (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
insured's misrepresentation regarding history as cigarette smoker constituted material misrep-
resentation justifying insurer's rescission of policy); Peters v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Co., - F.2d -, No.- 89-6220 (6th Cir. 1991) (text in WESTLAW) (holding that
material misrepresentation justifies rescission of insurance contract); William Penn Life Ins.
Co. v. Sands, 912 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Florida law as allowing rescission
of insurance contract when insured knowingly makes misstatement in response to unambiguous
question on insurance application to obtain coverage or lower premium); Hawaiian Life Ins.
Co., Ltd. v. Laygo, 884 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that material misrepresentation
justified insurer's rescission of insurance coverage); Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 849 F.2d
1473 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); Garde v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1988)(same);
Verex Assurance, Inc. v. John Hanson Savings & Loan, 816 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
185. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
186. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 416 (1971).
187. Id. at 406.
188. Id. at 417.
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route involved extraordinary cost or community disruption or unless the
alternatives presented unique problems.8 9
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Overton Park, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
Secretary properly rejected as imprudent the alternatives to a proposed
highway project that included the use of an area of historical significance.
In Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159 (4th
Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary had not complied with
section 4(f) in determining that the alternatives to a proposed highway
project were imprudent and unfeasible.
The dispute in Hickory Neighborhood Defense League began when the
North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) proposed to widen
a North Carolina highway. Approximately three blocks of the proposed
widening would have occurred in the Claremont Historic District. Because
the proposed project would pass through a historic site, NCDOT prepared
an evaluation of the project and proposed alternatives as required by section
4(f) of the Act. The evaluation concluded that no feasible and prudent
alternatives existed and that NCDOT had considered all means to minimize
harm to the historic site. The United States Department of the Interior
agreed with NCDOT's conclusions. The Secretary approved the findings of
NCDOT's section 4(f) evaluation and the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) authorized right-of-way acquisitions. The Hickory Neighborhood
Defense League filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, seeking an injunction against the widening of
the North Carolina highway. The district court determined that the Secretary
had complied with the requirements of section 4(f) and with the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. section 4332
(1977) and, therefore, denied plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief and
dismissed the action.
Hickory Neighborhood Defense League appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court regarding the Secretary's compli-
ance with requirements of NEPA. However, the Fourth Circuit vacated the
district court's holding that the Secretary had complied with the requirements
of section 4(f) of the Act and remanded the case back to the district court
to determine whether the Secretary had properly determined that no prudent
and feasible alternatives to the proposed project existed. On remand, the
district court determined that the Secretary properly determined that no
prudent and feasible alternatives to the proposed project existed and that
the facts before the Secretary supported his decision to reject the alternatives.
The district court's determination that the Secretary's decision was
proper and supported by the record resulted in the instant action. Plaintiffs
appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the Secretary failed to
comply with section 4(f) in determining that no feasible and prudent
189. Id. at 418.
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alternatives existed. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Secretary
failed to make the finding required by Overton Park that the alternatives
to the proposed highway project would result in extraordinary costs or
community disruption or presented unique problems. To resolve the issue,
the Fourth Circuit began by emphasizing that the mere fact that the Secretary
did not use the terms "unique" and "extraordinary" when considering the
alternatives did not compel a finding that the Secretary failed to comply
with the requirements of section 4(f) of the Act and Overton Park. The
Fourth Circuit clarified its holding in the first Hickory Defense League
appeal by stating that its decision did not hold that the Secretary failed to
comply with statutory requirements. Instead, the court stated that its first
holding merely meant that, in the absence of specific findings of unique
problems, the record was unclear with respect to whether the Secretary had
determined that such problems existed. According to the Fourth Circuit,
this deficiency in the record required that the court remand the case to the
district court for a specific finding as to whether the Secretary complied
with section 4(f) in the aftermath of Overton Park.
After clarifying its previous holding, the Fourth Circuit went on to
discuss the proper application of the Supreme Court's decision in Overton
Park. The Fourth Circuit agreed with another circuit court that when the
Overton Park Court said that alternative routes must present unique prob-
lems in order to use a highway route that would use protected land, the
Supreme Court used the word "unique" only for emphasis. Therefore, in
order for the Secretary to find that no feasible or prudent alternatives exist,
the Secretary need not find that all the alternatives present unique problems.
Instead, the Secretary need only ensure that the reasons for using protected
land as opposed to alternative routes are compelling and carefully evaluated.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the Secretary should begin with a pre-
sumption against using the protected land, but this presumption may be
overcome if the Secretary determines that no prudent and feasible alterna-
tives to the proposed route through protected land exist. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit held that the Secretary's determination that compelling
reasons existed for rejecting the proposed alternatives as imprudent was
consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Overton Park.
Next, the Fourth Circuit considered whether relevant facts in the record
supported the Secretary's decision. The Fourth Circuit noted various factors
in the record which tended to indicate that the proposed alternatives to the
highway project were imprudent. In its review of the factors relevant to the
Secretary's decision, the Fourth Circuit indicated that the Secretary's deci-
sion took into account all important factors, such as access to hospitals,
disturbance of residential neighborhoods, possible operational problems with
traffic patterns, and highway design difficulties. The Fourth Circuit also
determined that a cumulation of small problems may be a sufficient reason
for the Secretary to discard the proposed alternatives and to use protected
land. Although the Fourth Circuit conceded that the Secretary's determi-
nation in this case was not a model section 4(f) evaluation, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the facts in the record supported the Secretary's
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
determination that strong and compelling reasons existed for rejecting the
proposed highway alternatives as not prudent.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Hickory Neighborhood Defense League
is in accord with the holdings of other circuits that have reviewed a section
4(f) determination in the aftermath of Overton Park. 9° The Fourth Circuit
and other circuits have followed the Overton Park mandate that reviewing
courts take a hard look at agency action. 19' However, the circuit courts
have recognized that review of section 4(f) determinations requires a con-
sideration of the special facts in each particular case, and that the Secretary
need not recite any particular words or phrases to support his determination.
With the decision in Hickory Neighborhood Defense League, the Fourth
Circuit indicated its agreement with this analysis.
Public participation in land use regulation has been a source of contro-
versy in the past and continues to be an important issue, especially in the
context of controversial or locally unwanted land uses. The United States
Supreme Court has held that allowing one set of property owners to
determine th extent or kind of use that another property owner may make
of his property violates the due process rights of the property owner under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.'9
The Court has noted that ordinances granting this type of power to the
public without any type of standard or guideline is an impermissible dele-
gation of legislative authority that violates due process rights of the affected
property owner. 93 Against this background the United States Court of
190. See Eagle Found, Inc. V. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
Overton Park does not require use of work "unique" for rejection of alternatives in section
4(f) analysis, and stating that reasons for rejection of alternatives need only be pressing and
well thought out); Town of Fenton v. Dole, 636 F. 2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming district
court's determination that cumulation of small problems was enough to support rejection of
alternatives in section 4(f) determination); Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 1982)
(noting that Secretary need not use "magic" terminology in section 4(f) analysis).
191. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (noting that, under Administrative
Procedure Act, reviewing court is to engage in "substantial inquiry" of agency action).
192. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 140, 143-44 (1912) (holding that Richmond
ordinance requiring building committee to establish set-back lines for given piece of property
in accordance with requests by two-thirds of adjacent property owners violated due process
rights of affected property owner). See also Washington Ex Rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928) (striking down Seattle ordinance that conditioned building
permit for charitable home on obtaining consent of two-thirds of owners located within four
hundred feet of proposed building and declaring ordinance repugnant to due process clause
of Fourteenth Amendment).
193. See Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143-44 (noting unbridled and standardless discretion given
to property owners by ordinance requiring building committee to adopt set-back lines requested
by two-thirds of adjacent property owners); Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121-22 (noting that ordinance
requiring consent of two-thirds of surrounding property owners for issuance of building permit
for charitable home allows surrounding owners to withhold consent for selfish or arbitrary
reasons, subjecting affected property owner to their will or caprice). But see Silverman v.
Barry, 851 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting that delegation of authority to private citizens
was not Supreme Court's real concern in Eubank and Roberge, but only cover for more
controversial concerns).
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutional validity of a
West Virginia statute that allowed a public official to deny a solid waste
disposal facility permit based on adverse public sentiment in Geo-Tech
Reclamation Industries, Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989).
In 1986, Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries, Inc. (GRI) obtained an
option to purchase a potential landfill site and subsequently filed an appli-
cation with the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for
a landfill operating permit. The DNR director denied the application on
the ground that the proposed landfill generated adverse public sentiment,
even though the director determined that no insurmountable technical dif-
ficulties with the site plan existed. The director based his denial on W.VA.
CODE section 20-5F-4(b) (the statute), which allowed, but did not require,
the director to deny solid waste disposal facility permit applications upon
a finding of adverse public sentiment concerning the proposed facility. After
the denial of the GRI permit application, LCS Services, Inc. (LCS) acquired
an option to purchase the same site. The DNR director also denied the LCS
application for a permit to operate a solid waste disposal facility based on
adverse public sentiment as well as the destruction of aesthetic values and
the endangerment of the property of others. The West Virginia Water
Resources Board (the Board) affirmed the denial of the LCS permit appli-
cation based on adverse public sentiment even though testimony before the
Board had revealed that the LCS site development plan had no significant
technical failings. After the Board upheld the director's permit denial, LCS
and GRI brought declaratory judgment actions in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiffs, GRI and
LCS, claimed that the DNR's denial of their permit applications for devel-
opment of a solid waste disposal facility based on adverse public sentiment
violated their due process rights by impermissibly delegating legislative
authority to local citizens. The plaintiffs also argued that the DNR director's
reliance on the statute to deny their permits exceeded the state's police
power because the statute allowed the director to deny a solid waste disposal
facility permit based upon significant adverse public sentiment. The district
court held that the statutory provision allowing permit denial upon the basis
of adverse public sentiment was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power and, therefore, violated the due process rights of the owner of the
proposed disposal facility.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the state argued that the statute did
not impermissibly delegate legislative authority to private citizens because
the statute did not give local residents any legal power to block approval
of an otherwise qualified permit applicant. The state attempted to distinguish
the West Virginia statute from land use regulations that the Supreme Court
previously had invalidated as violating due process. In attempting to distin-
guish the West Virginia statute from the invalidated laws, the state pointed
out that the West Virginia statute merely gave the director authority to
include local public sentiment as one of many factors to be considered in
the exercise of his discretion to deny or approve a permit application. In
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contrast, the invalidated laws required government officials to reactaccord-
ing to the request of surrounding property owners.
In response to the state's argument that the West Virginia statute did
not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Fourth
Circuit initially stated that it need not decide this issue because the statute
suffered from a greater constitutional flaw. The Fourth Circuit stated that
land use regulations must be based on the police power and asserted for
the public welfare. The Fourth Circuit found that West Virginia could
properly protect the values of community spirit, pride, and quality of life
as part of its police power. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found that
the state had acted within the broad confines of its police power by
attempting to regulate solid waste disposal facilities. The court also conceded
that the statute promoted its stated purpose of protecting community
property values and pride by allowing citizens to comment on a proposed
landfill's impact on the community. The Fourth Circuit noted, however,
that many who oppose a landfill do so out of self-interest, bias, ignorance,
or other unacceptable motivations. The Fourth Circuit determined that,
despite the possibility of these unacceptable motivations, the statute con-
talned no meaningful standard by which the Director could measure adverse
sentiment to determine if significant adverse public sentiment existed or
whether the sentiment was informed and rational rather than selfish and
arbitrary. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that the provision
of the statute allowing landfill permit denial based solely on a finding of
adverse public sentiment was unconstitutional because the provision was not
rationally related to the statute's legitimate goal of protecting community
spirit, pride, and aesthetics.
In holding the West Virginia statute unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit
in Geo-Tech addressed a very controversial issue. The Geo-Tech court took
a new approach to the problem by applying principles from the Supreme
Court's line of zoning and land use cases to a dispute over a landfill permit
denial. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit embarked upon a path for resolving
disputes over landfills and other permitted facilities that would settle the
dispute by eliminating the public sentiment element and leaving the polls as
the only method for the public to express its disapproval of landfill siting.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
sections 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (RICO), prevents and punishes
certain corrupt practices in business operations. RICO provides a remedy
of treble damages in private actions for business operations in interstate or
foreign commerce that constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. The
pattern of racketeering requirement is necessary to justify the heavy penalties
that RICO provides and to prevent abuse of the RICO provisions. Courts,
however, have offered varying definitions of pattern of racketeering activity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), the Fourth Circuit had developed
a multi-factor test for determining a pattern of racketeering activity. The
multi-factor test weighed the number and variety of predicate acts, the
1991]
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length of time involved, the number of victims, the presence of separate
schemes, and the potential for multiple distinct injuries.194 In 1989, however,
the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. enunciated a "continuity plus relationship"
test for determining the pattern requirement. 95 The continuity plus relation-
ship test requires that a plaintiff demonstrate both that the racketeering
predicates are related and that those activities amount to a threat of
continued criminal activity. Predicate acts are related if the acts have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or have related characteristics and are not isolated events.'1
In deciding what constitutes continuity, the H.J. Inc. Court held that either
a close period of repeated conduct or past conduct that threatens future
repetition satisfies the continuity requirement. Thus, continuity requires that
the predicate acts amount to a threat of continuing racketeering activity. In
light of H.J. Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F. 2d 681 (4th Cir. 1989),
considered the criteria that courts should apply in deciding whether a pattern
of racketeering activity exists.
In Menasco the Fourth Circuit focused on the continuity requirement
outlined in H.J. Inc. Menasco, Inc. (Menasco) and Lucky Two, Inc. (Lucky
Two), the plaintiffs in Menasco, became partners in an oil and gas field
investment venture with defendant Wasserman, a principal of defendant
Sounion Petroleum (Sounion). The plaintiffs alleged that Wasserman mis-
represented that each partner would pay the same price for some additional
acreage offered to them by another partner. According to the plaintiffs,
Sounion inflated the price to two to five times the amount that Sounion
paid. The plaintiffs also alleged that Wasserman made various other mis-
representations designed to benefit Sounion. Further, the plaintiffs alleged
that Wasserman had solicited assignments of rights of action used to benefit
Sounion, that Wasserman had conspired with the lessor to terminate a well
lease for his own benefit and to the detriment of the plaintiffs, and that
Wasserman had transferred a substantial interest in some oil wells in which
Sounion was involved to other defendant companies in an attempt to shelter
Wasserman from liability. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of Was-
serman's activities, the plaintiffs lost $177,347.79.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found
that, as to Wasserman and Sounion, the complaint failed to allege the
194. See Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying multi-
factor analysis to civil RICO pattern inquiry on case-by-case basis); Walk v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 847 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1988) (requiring analysis of pattern requirement on
case-by-case basis and weighing particular facts of each case).
195. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989) (describing
continuity plus relationship test). The Supreme Court derived the continuity plus relationship
test from the legislative history of RICO. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479, 496 n.14 (1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)) (applying
continuity plus relationship language for first time).
196. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2901 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1985)) (defining
pattern of criminal conduct).
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pattern of racketeering activity that RICO requires. The district court,
therefore, dismissed the RICO claims. Because RICO had formed the basis
for federal jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the state law claims.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in holding
that the plaintiffs had failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. In
determining whether the plaintiffs alleged a pattern of racketeering activity,
the Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's continuity plus relationship
test of H.J. Inc. In particular, the Fourth Circuit reiterated the Supreme
Court's holding that the continuity prong requires a threat of long-term
criminal conduct, either through a closed period of repeated conduct or
past conduct that indicates that the activity is likely to continue in the
future. According to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff must show that the
predicate acts amount to a threat of continuing racketeering activity. How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that multiple illegal schemes were not
necessary to satisfy the pattern requirement. Although the existence of a
single scheme can be relevant to the continuity prong, the court noted that
the continuity plus relationship test emphasized a commonsensical approach,
allowing the possibility that multiple predicates within a single scheme would
satisfy the pattern requirement.
In evaluating the continuity plus relationship standard, the Menasco
court found that the defendants' fraudulent activities were limited in pur-
pose, that Wasserman was the sole perpetrator, that Menasco and Lucky
Two were the sole victims, and that the activities took place within one
year. The court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that Wasserman used
dummy corporations as a shelter from liability were insufficient to show a
threat of continuing racketeering activity. Additionally, the plaintiffs failed
to identify the persons against whom Wasserman allegedly perpetrated
fraudulent activities or the type of activities involved. The Fourth Circuit
used H.J. Inc. as a standard, finding that the time period of six years, the
variety of schemes, and the thousands of victims in the Supreme Court case
demonstrated the relative lack of a pattern of activity in the instant case.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the defendants' actions failed to satisfy
the continuity prong.
The plaintiffs also argued that the district court should have allowed
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
H.J. Inc.'s emphasis on the continuity requirement was sufficient reason to
allow the plaintiffs an attempt to comply with the RICO pattern require-
ment. Noting that the Supreme Court decided H.J. Inc. after the initiation
of the plaintiffs' suit, and despite the insufficiency of the plaintiffs' alle-
gations, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to allow
the plaintiffs to amend the complaint.
Although the Fourth Circuit's rationale is superficially consistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc., the factors that the Fourth
Circuit applied may be inappropriate in light of H.J. Inc.'s analysis.' 97
197. See Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting Supreme Court's
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Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that the scope of the activity, the
number of perpetrators, the number of victims, and the length of time
involved were, taken together, dispositive of the failure to satisfy the
continuity prong. However, H.J. Inc. made no mention of either the number
of victims or the number of perpetrators as relevant to the continuity prong
of the test, despite the fact that thousands of Northwestern Bell customers
suffered injuries. The Menasco court cited the number of victims as the
major distinguishing characteristic between Menasco and H.J. Inc. A few
courts, however, have discussed the possibility that H.J. Inc. suggests
duration as the sole determinative factor. 9 Conversely, several circuits have
rejected the durational approach in favor of the multi-factor approach
typified by Menasco.199 Still other courts have applied the H.J Inc. reasoning
but have resisted the adoption of any general test for guidance in evaluating
continuity. 2w°At the very least, Menasco places the Fourth Circuit in accord
with several circuits that have adopted an approach which has the advantage
of a more clearly defined perspective on the difficult interpretation of H.J
Inc.'s continuity prong.
lack of reference to either number of victims or number of perpetrators as relevant factors in
continuity analysis).
198. See Marshall-Silver Const. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing but rejecting view that H.J. Inc. suggests durational approach to continuity);
Hindes v. Castle, 740 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D. Del. 1990) (recognizing durational approach and
possibility that Third Circuit adopted durational approach). Duration may be determinative if
the duration is too short to meet the threshold requirements for a RICO violation. See H.J.
Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2902 (noting that acts occurring over few months do not satisfy continuity
requirement); American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Gaskins, 920 F.2d 352, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that short duration of criminal activity is determinative).
199. See Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 1990) (adopting multi-factor approach
on basis that H.J. Inc. does not negate multi-factor analysis); United States Textiles, Inc. v.
Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying four factors of number
and variety of predicate acts, number of victims, presence of separate schemes, and presence
of distinct injuries to determine whether pattern exists); Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 596-97
(rejecting durational approach); U.S. v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring
reference to external facts to demonstrate continuity); Sutherland v. O'Malley, 882 F.2d 1196,
1204 (7th Cir. 1989) (considering time, number of victims, presence of separate schemes, and
occurrence of distinct injuries); Interwest Med. Corp. v. Longterm Care Found., 748 F. Supp.
467, 468-69 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (considering sole victim, single scheme, and single injury as
relevant factors); Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 906, 913 (S.D. Ga. 1990)
(considering duration of scheme, number of victims, and occurrence of distinct injuries).
200. See Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting test for pattern
inquiring whether acts are sporadic or isolated, but failing to adopt particular continuity test);
Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing Supreme Court's flexible continuity definition and requiring continuing threat to
satisfy pattern requirement).
